How Farmers Bid Into the Conservation Reserve Program: An Empirical Analysis of CRP Offers Data by Jacobs, Keri L. et al.
 
How Farmers Bid into the Conservation Reserve Program:   






Corresponding Author:  Keri L. Jacobs 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Economics 





Walter N. Thurman 
Wm. Neal Reynolds Distinguished Professor 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
North Carolina State University 
Raleigh, North Carolina 
 
 
Michele C. Marra 
Professor and Specialist 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
North Carolina State University 





Paper prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association’s 2011 








Copyright 2011 by K.L. Jacobs, W.N. Thurman, and M.C. Marra.  All rights reserved.  Please do 
not copy or quote without consent from the authors.  2 
 
I. Introduction 
  The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) constitutes the largest-scale experiment to 
date in government payments for ecosystem services.  Begun in 1985, the CRP currently idles 
approximately 31 million acres (a land mass about the size of Mississippi) at an annual cost near 
$1.9 billion.  In return for idling land, CRP participants receive annual streams of payments 
during their 10 year contract period and, for funding those payments, U.S. taxpayers receive a 
stream of conservation, or ecosystem, services that includes enhancements to wildlife habitat, 
carbon sequestration, and benefits deriving from reduced soil erosion. 
  The method by which land is enrolled in the CRP has evolved over time.  It now consists 
of an elaborate bidding system,
1 in which participants increase their likelihood of enrollment by 
offering land with certain characteristics and agreeing to engage in enhanced conservation 
practices.  The evolved details of the bidding system are codified in the Environmental Benefits 
Index (EBI) – a scoring system that takes into account the putative ecosystem services from a 
land parcel and the rental rate demanded by the land owner.  A portion of the EBI score a parcel 
receives is determined exogenously by the federal government.  For example, land enrolled from 
areas determined to have particular conservation value (Conservation Priority Areas) is given 
bonus points – priority-area points – in the EBI, thus giving the offer an advantage in enrollment 
acceptance.  But part of the EBI score constitutes an endogenous choice by the landowner.  Most 
notably, the per-acre rental rate demanded by a landowner enters into the EBI with a negative 
weight: more expensive parcels are moved down the priority list for enrollment.  The 
                                                            
1 The standard terminology in the CRP literature describes the process by which landowners formulate offers as 
“bidding.”  In typical usage, one “bids” to buy and “offers” to sell goods or services.  In this sense, landowners are 
offering the environmental services of their land in the CRP.  However, for ease of exposition, we concede to 
established convention and refer to a contract submitted as an “offer” and the rental rate component of the offer as 
the landowner’s “bid.” 
 3 
 
straightforward implication of this mix of exogenous and endogenous components of the EBI is 
that the rental rates that landowners bid to enroll in the CRP will be chosen strategically to adapt 
to changes in the scoring mechanism.  If the EBI is revised to induce more enrollment from areas 
deemed to be rich in ecosystem services, the bid response from landowners in such areas will 
temper (or, perhaps, magnify) the area’s enrollment response, depending on the strategic choice 
of landowners.  Further, not only will the enrollment outcome depend upon the endogenous bid 
response to a change in the scoring mechanism, so too will the ultimate payments to landowners 
and the costs of the program to taxpayers. 
  This paper is about how CRP offers are influenced by a parcel’s designation as a 
Conservation Priority Area.  We present a theoretical model of a landowner’s optimal bid and 
analyze the choice empirically from an as-yet unexamined data set of the approximately 270,000 
accepted and unaccepted offers from CRP signups in 1997, 1998 and 2000.  We focus 
empirically on a subset of offers from the Prairie Pothole Conservation Priority Area, which 
includes parts of Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota—states that 
account for 35% of the land enrolled in the CRP. 
 
II. Previous  Analysis of the CRP 
Since 1985, there have been 41 CRP enrollment periods, or signups.
2  The first nine were 
general signups administered within the context and guidelines established in the 1985 Farm Bill.  
The CRP’s primary objective during this period was mandated to be reduced soil erosion with 
secondary objectives that included protection of production capacity, farm income support, 
                                                            
2 The 40
th signup is a continuous one and will be ongoing through September 30, 2011. 4 
 
improved water quality, and improvement in fish and wildlife habitat.
3  In these initial signups, 
offers to enroll were solicited but no information was made public about how offers were to be 
ranked for enrollment. Enrollment was accomplished using regional “pools” and, in Signup 1, 
not even the maximum allowable bid was known.  Miranda (1992) used offers data from the first 
signup to examine whether or not landowners formulate their offer to account for the future on-
farm productivity gains that result from reduced soil erosion.  She found a weak connection, 
concentrated in the Corn Belt, between landowners’ bids and the onsite productivity gains to 
enrollment.  
  After the first signup, landowners learned the maximum rent they could offer for their 
land, which was the same for all landowners in a multi-county pool.  Shoemaker (1989) 
decomposed land value growth data over a period that coincided with the first four signups and 
estimated the extent to which CRP rents were capitalized into land values.  He observed that land 
was offered at successively higher rental rates with each signup and attributed this fact to 
learning.  He concluded that landowners were able to extract additional rent from the program in 
excess of their individual opportunity costs.  Reichelderfer and Boggess (1988) analyzed CRP 
data from the first three signups and concluded that learning by landowners can lead to lower-
than-average valued land being offered at average values.  Smith (1995) characterized the 
properties of a least-cost CRP using mechanism design theory under assumptions of information 
asymmetry and marginal lands rents and found that while an offer system, much like what is 
currently used, is preferred to an auction when land rents are independent of the size of the 
farming operation, the first nine general signups cost more than they would have if landowners 
had bid their opportunity cost.  
                                                            
3 Thurman (1995), Cochrane and Runge (1992) and Orden, Paarlberg and Roe (1999) provide discussions of the 
early CRP and implications of the conservation policies resulting from the 1985 Farm Bill. 5 
 
  The CRP that resulted from the 1990 Farm Bill looked different from that which came 
out of the 1985 Farm Bill.  Sustainable agriculture emerged as a theme in nearly all the 
commodity and conservation programs and, as a result, the CRP’s objectives were redirected to 
water quality improvement in addition to reducing soil erosion.  Subsequently, the literature’s 
focus turned to understanding the CRP’s ability to target multiple objectives in a cost-effective 
manner.  The first signup of the new CRP era, Signup 9, began using an index (initially a black 
box) that accepted offers based on their ratio of expected environmental benefits to cost (Osborn 
1993, Thurman 1995).  Babcock et al. (1996, 1997) used heterogeneity in the agricultural 
productivity and environmental quality of a county’s enrolled land to evaluate the performance 
of the CRP under various environmental targeting criteria.  They concluded that to the extent that 
environmental quality is positively correlated with land productivity, enrolling land into the 
program based on cost alone will perform poorly in terms of capturing water and soil erosion 
benefits. 
  Two recent papers relate closely to the analysis in this paper.  Kirwan, Lubowski and 
Roberts (KLR) (2005) estimate the premiums for CRP participants above their “true” reservation 
rents and apply a state fixed-effects model to identify the relationship between a contract’s 
environmental score (the non-cost EBI score) and the per-acre premium a landowner receives.  
Similarly, Marra and Vukina (1998) and Vukina et al. (2008) model bids from CRP offers to 
enroll land to understand how landowners formulate their optimal “bidding” strategies, whether 
the offers reveal information about the landowners’ preferences towards conservation, and if the 
bids exhibit a “strategic” effect.  Like KLR (2005), they find that farmers condition their bid on 
their parcel’s EBI score.  Additionally, they found that landowners valued the environmental 
benefits of conservation, particularly as they led to perceived improvements in their parcels’ 6 
 
future productivity.  Marra and Vukina’s (1998) and Vukina et al.’s (1998) work is novel in that 
they analyze all offers for enrollment into the program for the 15
th Signup in North Carolina. 
Previous works relied on information from accepted contracts only.   
  The present paper analyzes how, given the current auction structure of CRP enrollment, a 
landowner’s bid should and does change when an offer’s probability of acceptance is 
exogenously increased.  Like KLR (2005), Marra and Vukina (1998) and Vukina et al. (2008), 
the theoretical and empirical model posits that landowners condition their bid on their perceived 
probability of acceptance, identified by their EBI score.  The theory developed in this paper, as 
in Vukina et al. (2008), accounts for pecuniary and well as the non-pecuniary benefits 
landowners derive from participation in the program.  It extends their work and that of KLR by 
isolating an exogenous component of the EBI – conservation priority area points – to  identify 
landowners’ optimal bid responses from all offers to participate in the CRP, accepted and 
rejected, not solely those offers that were eventually accepted for enrollment.   
  The theory is implemented empirically utilizing data for all submitted offers during the 
16
th, 18th and 20
th general signups, in 1997, 1998, and 2000.
4  Accepted and rejected offers are 
observed and all offers within a relatively small geographic area are compared using a natural 
experiment approach to identify the effects of exogenous changes in the probability of 
acceptance on landowners’ bids.  The ability to compare the population of CRP offers in a small 
geographic area, where assumptions of homogeneity in the production and factor markets are 
plausible, offers a unique opportunity to exploit the theoretical model in a way that, to our 
knowledge, has not been done. 
 
                                                            
4 The program years for these signups are 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001.  Therefore, some of these offers resulted in 
contracts that are effective yet in 2011. 7 
 
 
III.  Theoretical Framework:  Landowner’s Expected Return  
We develop a theoretical model to describe a general signup of the CRP. A landowner 
maximizes his expected returns from enrolling in the CRP by choosing his bid in an environment 
of uncertainty over the program parameters.  The landowner’s bid  is assumed to be made 
conditional on the offer’s environmental score, the parcel’s maximum soil rental rate, the 
landowner’s expectation of and preferences for on-farm and off-farm conservation benefits,  and 
the landowner’s subjective evaluation of the strength of his offer relative to the other offers 
against which his competes.
5 
 
The Government’s Problem 
The government wants to enroll  A acres by choosing offers with the highest EBI scores (
e) where e, the separable and additive sum of points an offer receives, is based on the bid and 
environmental provisions of the offer.  Every offer’s EBI score is determined using the following 
rule:
6 
  (, )       rN erN r N ββ =+  (1.1) 
where  r β  and   N β  are program parameters set by the government that determine how cost and 
conservation provisions are score,  0, 0, rN β β < >   r is the offered rental rate (bid) and  N is the 
level of  environmental services offered, considered here to be fixed. 
                                                            
5 The environmental score an offer receives is the non-cost component of the Environmental Benefits Index.  The 
index and scoring is discussed in a subsequent section. 
 
6 This is an abstraction from the complex EBI formula but reflects the true form of the EBI in that the EBI is 
separable and additive in the cost and non-cost components. Further, the cost component is linear in the bid. 8 
 
For a concrete example, suppose that the shape of  () geis that of a normal distribution 
and  () ge is normalized such that 
  () 1. ge d e
∞
−∞
= ∫  (1.2) 
The total acreage offered from the distribution of EBI scores across farmers, whose bid is 
described by  () ge, is 
  () . ge d e
∞
−∞ ∫  (1.3) 
The cut-off EBI (e
∗) is chosen by the government after landowners reveal their bids, such that 





= ∫  (1.4) 
It is not assumed that the government knows  () . ge   It simply ranks bids by EBI (e) and, starting 
from the highest e, accepts offers of acreage into the CRP until  A acres are enrolled.  The 
distribution  () geis normalized for analytical convenience such that 
  () d 1 ge e
∞
∞
= ∫ . (1.5) 
 Then, the cut-off EBI can formally be derived from properties of the normal distribution as 
  () 1
ee e
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This implies that 
e μ
σ
∗ − is the (1 ) 100
th A −× percentile of the z (standard normal) distribution, 
implying further that, by symmetry of the distribution:  








= =− . (1.7) 
Thus, the government chooses the cut-off EBI, e
∗, which enrolls  A acres from the distribution 
of all EBI scores,  () ge, such that 
  A ez μ σ
∗ =− . (1.8) 
In this example, to know with certainty the cut-off requires knowledge of the mean and variance 
of the distribution of offers as well as the targeted level of enrollment.  In other situations, where 
the distribution of offers was not described by the normal distribution, features of  () ge beyond 
the first two moments would have to be known. 
 
The Landowner’s Problem 
The landowner’s problem is two-staged and his offer reflects uncertainty over the 
government’s actions and the supply of competing acres.  The first-stage decision compares the 
returns to participating in the CRP with the alternative choice, agricultural production.
7  If the 
landowner does not participate in the CRP he receives with certainty an annual profit,  . π   
Participating in the CRP results in a fixed annual return: 
                                                            
7 The alternative use for the land is assumed to be agricultural production. The CRPs rules require that enrolled land 
having a recent cropping history or have been continuously enrolled in the CRP.  Other land use choices can be 
modeled in this framework so long as in the alternative choice, the landowner formulates his expectations about both 
the pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns from the land use activity when no CRP contract is made. 
 10 
 
  () ,
CRP Rr b N =+  (1.9) 
 where r is the bid and  () bN the net non-pecuniary benefits of participating in the CRP over the 
alternative.
8   
The bid is restricted by the program’s rules to be less than the maximum soil rental rate 
() r , a per-acre maximum annual rent payment established by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) 
based on the parcel’s three predominant soil types and their productivity as established by the 
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS).  Thus, a participation condition exists and 
must hold for each offer to enroll in the CRP: 
  () ,
CRP Rr b N π ≡ +≥  (1.10) 
for some  . rr ≤  The condition states that there exists an r for which the net value of participating 
if accepted is greater than or equal to the profits if not accepted. An offer is observed only if 
condition (1.10) holds and implies that for a bidding landowner the bid that satisfies this 
participation condition is in the set: 
  { } |, rr r r ∈≤ ≤ \  (1.11) 
where  () . rb N π =−   Offers are not observed when the maximum rental rate does not satisfy the 
participation condition in (1.10), when 
  () . rb N π <−  (1.12) 
                                                            
8 Non-pecuniary benefits are a function of N and include the expected increase in future on-farm productivity and 
measures of the private net benefits associated with conservation and open space amenities that result from enrolling 
land in the CRP.  These benefits are assumed to be net of the enrollment and practice-installation costs.   11 
 
The participation condition implies that a landowner will bid no less than r , which implies 
through equation (1.1) an EBI no higher than  . e   Similarly, the programmatic upper bound on 
bids of r implies a lower bound on EBI of  . e   Thus, for a given landowner, the feasible set of 
EBI values is given by:  
  { } |  where   and  . rN rN ee e e erNe rN ββ ββ ∈≤ ≤ = + = + \  (1.13) 
In this way, r and N are substitutes in the production of e.     
In the second stage, the landowner implicitly chooses an optimal  0 e  by choosing an 
optimal  0 r such that, ex post, the offer is accepted if  ( ) 00 , erN e
∗ ≥ and rejected otherwise; this is 
deterministic.  Ex ante, the landowner is uncertain about  () , ge , r β  and  A and therefore doesn’t 
know e
∗ with certainty.  But the subjective probability of his acceptance can be seen to increase 
with  . e   His uncertainty reduces to that over 
2 (, ) μ σ and . r β  To consider the problem formally, 
assume 
2 σ ,  A, and  r β  are known and that the landowner’s prior belief over μ  is given by: 
 
2
00 () ( , ) . pn μ μτ =  (1.14) 
Then the landowner’s subjective probability of acceptance,  () , a Pe where μ  is random is: 
 
0 () ( ) , a A Pe P e e z μ σ
∗ => = − (1.15) 



































where  (.) Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF).  The landowner’s 
expectation of the cut-off bid is:  
  0 () , A E ez μ σ
∗ =−  (1.18) 













The expression in equation (1.22) interprets the CDF in terms of the landowner’s understanding 
of the parameters of the government’s problem and centers the distribution of all other offers 
around  () , E e
∗ the landowner’s expectation of the cut-off bid.     
The acceptance outcome is a random variable and the landowner’s perceived probability 
of acceptance depends on (1) his choice variables, which determine  , e  (2) the landowner’s 
beliefs about the characteristics of offers from all other CRP applicants 
2 (, ) , μ σ and 3) the 
landowner’s expectations of the rules of the program (,) . r A β  Figure 1 illustrates that the 
acceptance probability is increasing in e.  That the probability is bounded between zero and one 
implies that the relation between  a P  and ecannot be globally concave or convex. 13 
 
The assumptions of a normally shaped distribution of offers,  () , ge and a normal prior for 
the landowner regarding the mean of  () , ge   , μ  results in the normal CDF depicted in figure 1.  
In more general settings,  () a Pe need not be a normal CDF; however, the weak monotonicity of 
() a Pe in eis a general property. 
   
Optimal rental rate choice and implied optimal EBI 
Landowners bid an offered level of payments should they be accepted into the CRP.  For 
a fixed level of conservation services,  , N  the formula for the EBI in equation (1.1) implies a 
linear correspondence between r  and  . e  We use this fact to characterize the landowner’s 
problem as a choice of  . e  Therefore, the landowner’s maximization problem becomes: 
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 (1.20) 
where the last line in equation (1.20) makes use of equation (1.1) and the implied dependence 











=  (1.21) 
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition (from (1.20)) implies: 
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+  (1.23) 
The FOC expresses the equality of the marginal benefit (MB) and marginal cost (MC) from a 













⎛⎞ − − ′ ≡− ≡ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
+  (1.24) 
  The landowner’s MB of increasing  0 e  (accomplished by decreasing  0 r ) is a “probability 
of acceptance effect”: the landowner substitutes a lower rental rate if accepted for a greater 
probability of acceptance that results from the higher  0. e   In the expected value payoff, the 
change in probability,  ( ) 0 0, Fe ′ >  is weighted by  0 , rb π + −  the size of the advantage to being 
enrolled relative to not being enrolled. 
  The MC of increasing  0 e  is a “rental rate effect”: an increase in  0, e  achieved by reducing 




>   The payment reduction 
generated by the lowered bid is weighted by  ( ), o Fe the probability of acceptance.  A landowner 
will increase  0 e to the point at which the MB of doing so is just equal to the MC.  It is possible 
that this point ( ) MBM C = occurs where  0 rr > .  Participation is not ruled out if at r the 
participation condition is satisfied and  . MBM C >  
  The second-order condition, evaluated at the optimal choice value is: 



















A comparative statics analysis of a landowner’s adjustment of  0 e  due to a change in N  can be 
found from the total differential of (1.25): 












⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎡ ⎤ − ′′ ′ ′ +− + + − = ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥
⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
 (1.26) 
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By the SOC in equation (1.25) the denominator of equation (1.27) is negative and therefore 
0 de
dN
is unambiguously positive.  An exogenous increase in N  unambiguously increases  , e  even 






















β >  Thus, in response to an exogenous increase in the parcel’s N   – a ceteris paribus  
increase in the offer’s EBI – the  landowner will adjust his optimal rental rate either higher or 
lower depending on the MB and MC of doing so.  However, the total effect of such changes – 
the increase in N and the resulting increase or decrease in  0 r  – in all cases results in a higher  0. e   16 
 
On net, the landowner’s probability of acceptance is higher than before the additional non-cost 
EBI points.












>   The latter says that higher-EBI 
landowners (landowners with more N) have higher (more positive) rental rate responses to 
increases in their N, a result that ties directly to the marginal benefits and costs associated with 
increasing the bid. 
  The ambiguity of bid response to an exogenous change in  , N  such as a change in EBI 
scoring that awards points based on location, makes the bid response to such a change a 
fundamentally empirical question. 
 
IV. Identification,  Data and Empirical Model 
We apply our theoretical model using contract level Conservation Reserve Program 
offers data to investigate how bids are affected by changes in EBI points.  In particular, we are 
interested in identifying the bid effect from exogenous EBI point changes.   Identification of the 
effects of changes in EBI points on rental rate offers is achieved by decomposing the EBI scoring 
mechanism.
10  The EBI used for general signups 16, 18 and 20 was subdivided into six 
environmental (non-cost) ranking factors (N1 through N6) which identify targeted concerns 
(wildlife, water quality, etc.), and one cost-based ranking factor (N7).  Each offer receives a 
                                                            
9 The ambiguity of the effect on  0 r from a change in N relates to the size of the changes in MB and MC.  An 
exogenous increase in EBI points leapfrogs a bidder ahead of others and places him in a different part of the 
distribution of offers.  If that part of the distribution is thicker with offers, then the benefit of further increases in  0 e
by reducing  0 r can be large and the optimal response of  0 r  to an increase in N can be negative. Conversely, the 
new position in the distribution occasioned by the increase in N could result in low expected gains to further bid 
reduction. 
 
10 Jacobs (2010) provides a thorough exposition of the EBI scoring mechanism and how it has changed through the 
program’s history.  
 17 
 
score – the sum of the non-cost (environmental) factors – that is intended to reflect the parcel’s 
provision of environmental benefits and the non-cost score is provided to the landowner when 
his offer is submitted.  The last component of the offer’s EBI score is the cost factor.  The 
landowner must offer a rental rate (bid) at or below his parcel’s maximum rental rate, which is 
known.  He does not know how his bid – the primary component of the cost factor – will 
translate to EBI points when the FSA determines the cost factor scoring parameters.
 11  The cost 
factor points are added to the non-cost points in determining the parcel’s total EBI score.   
While a portion of the non-cost points a landowner receives depend at least in part on the 
conservation-type practices undertaken, some of the factors are, wholly or in part, exogenous. 
One exogenous ranking factor during general signups 16, 18 and 20 was the N6 component – 
conservation priority areas.  Conservation priority areas (CPAs) are state- and federally-
designated regions in which an environmental concern (air, water, or wildlife related) has been 
identified.  In the EBI scoring mechanism, the N6 priority area factor awarded 25 points to 
eligible offers inside federal CPAs.  CPAs are exogenous to the landowner and the associated 
EBI points therefore represent an exogenous increase in his offer’s probability of acceptance.  
This program mechanism permits a straightforward way for us to identify landowner’s rental rate 
responses to exogenous EBI points and, further, to test whether these points have the same effect 
on rental rate as the other ranking factor points, some of which are thought to be endogenous 
with the bid.  
 
                                                            
11 The cost factor formula contains parameters set by the administrators after all offers have been received.  The 




⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ −+ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
where a and b  are 
determined based on the offers received and r is the landowner’s bid.  The landowners receive 10 points for not 
requesting conversation practice installation cost sharing (0 points for requesting any cost share) and can receive 1 
point for every whole dollar that the bid is below the maximum soil rental rate, up to 15 points.  For signups 16, 18 
and 20,  125 a = and  165. b =  18 
 
Data 
CRP offers from the Prairie Pothole region in the United States
12 for general signups 16, 
18 and 20 are used to implement empirical tests of the theory.
13  The offers data are landowners’ 
submitted offers to enroll in the CRP and contain the components of individual EBI scores, the 
maximum rental rates for each offer, and the rental rate submitted by the landowner.  The 
advantage of these data is that we observe the behavior of all landowners who attempt to enroll 
in the program, not just landowners who are successful in enrolling.  The Prairie Pothole region 
(see figure 2) covers portions of Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota and 
was deemed a conservation priority area (CPA) prior to the 16
th general signup.
14  There are 
other conservation priority areas (not overlapping with the Prairie Pothole region) established for 
the purposes of the program; this CPA is chosen because it overlaps with a substantial 
agricultural production region that historically has high participation in the CRP.   
Identifying the effects on rental rates from changes in exogenous EBI points is achieved 
by comparing, for several crop reporting districts (CRDs), offers that received the exogenous 
priority-area points from the N6 factor with those that did not.  A CRD, as defined by the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service,  is a grouping of counties that are adjacent to each other 
and that have common agricultural production characteristics.  The counties in a CRD always lie 
within the same state and a CRD is small enough that we may be willing to assert that 
                                                            
12 The Prairie Potholes region also extends into Canada 
 
13 In general, the EBI scoring mechanism for general signups can change from one signup to the next.  These 
signups were selected because they represent three coterminous general signups for which the EBI scoring rubrics 
were the same.  The fact that the EBI used to ranked offers did not change over these three signup periods supports 
our presumption that what we are measuring is not confounded by effects on bid by changes in the EBI.  
 
14 In the Prairie Pothole CPA the priority of concern is in preservation or re-establishment of the “potholes” left 
behind by glacial recessions. In their natural state, the potholes are rich in plant and aquatic life and provide 
breeding, nesting, and migratory support to many species of waterfowl.  They act as important aquatic reserve an 
enhance drainage systems.   19 
 
landowners within it face similar production economies and decisions.  The fact that the Prairie 
Pothole CPA is defined using county boundaries permits us to identify Prairie Pothole counties 
and non-Prairie Pothole counties within the same CRD. Thus, we can compare, at the CRD level, 
offers that received the 25 Prairie Pothole CPA points for N6 – call these “Prairie Pothole offers” 
– with those in the same CRD that did not, the “non Prairie Pothole offers.” 
A summary of the offered rental rates and EBI points during Signup 18 from CRDs used 
in this analysis are shown in table 1.
15  Here we identify, for each CRD, the number of offers in 
(PP=1) and out (PP=0) of the Prairie Pothole region and for each type of offer, the average of 
and variability in the maximum rental rates and amount by which bids are discounted from the 
maximum, and the average of the offers’ non-cost EBI scores (excluding priority area points).  
CRDs are listed approximately in order from those with the highest average maximum soil rental 
rates to the lowest.  Interestingly, it is roughly true in this sample of offers that the CRDs with 
the highest rental rates have the highest sum of environmental (non-cost) EBI points excluding 
the priority area points for N6 and the largest discount in their bids (Iowa and Minnesota, for 
example).  Further, the average rent discount for Prairie Pothole offers relative to non Prairie 
Pothole offers is larger in higher rent areas.  This difference in discounting disappears as the 
maximum rental rate decreases and even reverses in the low rent areas.
16  Generally speaking, 
the proportion of non-Prairie Pothole offers to Prairie Pothole offers in a CRD is stable over 
signups 16, 18 and 20 as are the maximum soil rental rates.  The average discounts of bids from 
maximum rental rates in a CRD exhibit some variation over the three signup periods; however, 
the difference in the discounting between Prairie Pothole and non Prairie Pothole offers is 
                                                            
15 Signup 18 is provided as a sample to highlight the data and its characteristics.  Summary statistics for signups 16 
and 20 are available upon request. 
 
16 Note that the difference in discount between Prairie Pothole and non Prairie Pothole offers is not statistically 
significant in most of the low rent areas. 20 
 
preserved.  Also, while the average non-cost EBI point totals by CRD vary over the signup 
periods, the relative size of the average of these points for Prairie Pothole offers and non Prairie 
Pothole offers do not vary much. 
Offers to enroll in the CRP in the general signup compete in a national pool against all 
offers based on their total EBI score and it has always been the case that there are more acres 
offered for enrollment than accepted.  Besides this nationally competitive factor where 
enrollment is capped at some ex-ante unknown level, the program statutes require that no more 
than 25% of a county’s agricultural land be enrolled in the CRP at any given time.  This creates a 
local constraint that is binding in some counties and may, because it is a source of uncertainty, 
influence the bidding behavior of landowners.  Though this particular constraint is not made 
explicit in the theoretical model, it is a factor influencing landowners’ subjective evaluation of 
the probability of being accepted for enrollment.  To the extent that a landowner perceives this 
rule to be binding on offers from his county, he may condition his bid on knowledge of current 
CRP enrollment.  We calculate enrollment in the CRP in the period just prior to the signup and 
construct the proportion of the county’s agricultural land that is, at the time of the signup, 
enrolled in the CRP.  Table 2 provides, by CRD, summary statistics of its counties’ proportion of 
agricultural land enrolled in the CRP just prior to each of the three signups
17.  CRP contract 
expirations that occur just prior to or during the signup may not be accounted for in this measure; 
however, we can reasonably posit that high county level enrollment, particularly enrollment 




17 Each CRD has a fixed number of counties over this period but the number of counties in CRDs varies.  
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Empirical Model of the Effects of EBI Points on Bids 
Based on our theoretical model and the comparative statics, we implement the following 
empirical specification to identify the effects of exogenous EBI points (Prairie Pothole points) on 
bid behavior: 
  12 3 1 2 ijt jt jt ijt jt ijt jt ijt jt i jt i ijt ijt rent rmax ebi prop PP PP ebi α ββ βδ δ ε =+ + + + + ⋅ +  (1.29) 
where  ijt rent  is the landowner’s bid,  ijt rmax is the offer’s parcel-specific maximum rental rate, 
ijt ebi is a measure based on the offer’s non-cost (environmental) EBI score,
18  ijt prop is the 
proportion of the county from which offer i originated that is currently enrolled in the CRP at 
the time of signup, and  i PP, is a dummy variable that is to equal to one if the offer received 25 
priority-area points and equals 0 otherwise.  Throughout, i indexes the individual contract (offer), 
j indexes the CRD, and t identifies the signup; there are 13 CRDs and 3 signup periods in the 
sample and the number of offers varies by CRD and signup.   
We assume a representative landowner because production decisions and local economies 
(basis, input prices, and so forth) that affect enrollment decisions are posited to be homogenous 
within a CRD.  In the model, rmax plays an important role as a measure of the parcel’s 
opportunity cost of enrolling in the CRP and also to control for heterogeneity among offers 
within a CRD that cannot otherwise be accounted for. The interaction term between the priority-
area dummy variable and EBI score provides two opportunities to identify landowner behavior:  
1)  whether landowners in the Prairie Pothole region condition their rental rate on other non-cost 
                                                            
18 Here,  ijt ebi is the sum of the offer’s non-cost EBI components excluding the priority area points (N6), divided by 
25.  This measure of the EBI score is diminished by a factor of 25 to be able to compare the coefficient estimate and 
marginal effects of  ijt ebi and  i PP , a dummy variable that is to equal to one if the offer received 25 priority-area 
points and equals 0 otherwise.  In this way we can compare the effect of exogenous priority area points with other 
EBI points on the bid. 22 
 
EBI points in the same manner as non Prairie Pothole landowners, and 2) whether landowners 
view the priority-area points as being equivalent to non-priority area points in the formulation of 
their bids.  If it is the case that the marginal effect on the bid from priority-area points and non-
priority area points is not different, then this suggests that priority area EBI are equivalent to non 
priority area EBI points in bid formulation, in which case the interaction effect becomes an 






>    
Our primary interests here are the marginal effects on bids from non-priority area  EBI 
points and the exogenous priority area points on bids.  Due to the interaction term ( 2 jt δ ) these 
marginal effects vary with PP and  . ebi  Evaluating the marginal effects at the sample means of 
PP and ebi  (for each CRD and signup combination) gives us two parameters of interest: 























To elicit directly these effects, Equation (1.29) is reparameterized by substituting for  2 jt β  and 
1 . jt δ  The resulting empirical model is: 
  ( )( ) 11 2 32 ijt ijt ijt i ijt i ijt ijt rent rmax rebi PP prop PP PP ebi ebi α βη η βδ ε ⎡⎤ =+ + + + + − − + ⎣⎦ (1.32) 
The bid is conditioned on the parcel’s maximum rental rate, the non-cost EBI score, the degree to 
which landowners might expect competition for enrollment into the CRP in their county, and the 
priority-area disposition of the offers.  The expectation is that the coefficients on rmax and ebi
will be positive and statistically significant.  The model also identifies whether the relationship 23 
 
between the bid and EBI may be affected by priority-area designations.  According to the 
theoretical comparative static results, landowners who receive an exogenous increase in their 
probability of acceptance will adjust their rental rate; the direction of the adjustment depends on 
the landowner’s evaluation of the strength of his offer. Further, higher EBI landowners will have 
more positive rental rate responses to exogenous increases in EBI points.  The coefficients that 
represent these two effects are  2 η and  2 δ . 
Each bid ( ijt rent ) is restricted to be less than or equal to  ijt rmax and, as a result, the 
dependent variable exhibits a mass of bids as their maximum.  We deal with this complication by 
estimating maximum likelihood censored regression models for equation (1.32).    Our empirical 
estimation allowed for observation-specific censoring of the dependent variable where the 
independent variable, rmax , is the upper-censoring point.  Tobit marginal effects – the variables’ 
effect on the bid conditional on the observation not being censored – evaluated at the variable 
means are provided by signup in tables 3a, 3b and 3c.  The tables also provide a measure of the 
degrees of censoring.  In general, landowners from low-rent areas such as ND and MT tend to 
offer the maximum rental rate with greater regularity than landowners from higher-rent areas of 
IA and MN.  However, the degree of censoring from any one CRD increases over time.   
The effects of interest – influences of maximum rental rates, non-cost EBI points, and 
priority area designations on bids – are discussed in turn below. The other explanatory variable – 
the proportion of the landowner’s county’s agricultural land enrolled in the CRP prior to the 
signup period – while likely an important control variable in a county-level analysis is not 
particularly informative from a predictive or marginal point of view of offers from CRDs.   
Further, this variable ranges from zero to approximately .25 (25%) and therefore a single county 
could not experience bidding behavior when  jt prop is zero in one case and then incrementally 24 
 
increased to one (100%).  However, it may be informative in the sense that, across the CRDs and 
signups, it generally holds that the statistically significant coefficient estimates are negative.  The 
fewer acres that can be accepted for enrollment in a county, the more competitive (lower) ought 
to be the bids submitted by landowners, ceteris paribus.  
 
The Role of Maximum Rental Rates on Bids 
The maximum rental rate for each parcel is an important variable in explaining the 
variation in bids.  The reasons are two:  landowners know the maximum rental rate they can bid 
and by construction the maximum reflects the agricultural productivity of the land.  For our 
purposes, this parcel-specific measure is useful as a control for unobserved heterogeneity 
between offers.  For all CRDs, we find that bids ( i rent ) are clearly conditioned on maximum 
rental rates ( i rmax ); marginal effects are positive, non-zero and statistically significant at a level 
greater than 1%.  The size of the marginal effects is not constant for all CRDs – an indication of 
the heterogeneity that exists between CRDs – nor is the relationship one-for-one.  The estimated 
marginal effects suggest that in the high rent CRDs (IA and MN) a $1 increase in maximum 
rental rates induces a $0.40 to $0.55 increase in the bids.  In the lower rent areas such as ND and 
MT, the marginal effects on bids from a $1 increase in the maximum rental rate range from 
$0.05 to about $0.23, markedly lower than in the higher rental rate areas.  A test of the 
hypothesis that  1 1 β =  in the estimations reveals that we should not expect a $1 increase in bids 
given a $1 increase in maximum rental rates and this holds at least at a 5% level of significance 
in all but a handful of cases, the exceptions to which occur in North Dakota CRDs in signup 20 
only.  The Wald test statistics for these restrictions are provided in table 4. 25 
 
While the marginal effects on bids of increasing the maximum rental rates is not zero and 
not one, we observe that bid responses are changing over time.  Bid responses to maximum 
rental rates appear to decline over time in CRDs in Minnesota, Montana and (generally) North 
Dakota.  However, only CRD 1910 in Iowa (NW portion of the state) shows a decline in the bid 
response while the other two CRDs in Iowa exhibit increasing or at least variable bid responses 
over the period.  
The primary observation from these marginal bid effects is that, on average, landowners 
in high rent areas bid further below their maximum rental rates than do landowners in low rent 
areas but have higher (more positive) bid responses to increases in their maximum rental rate.  
This highlights the major difference in the regions in this study and allows us to draw 
comparisons between them in terms of landowner bidding behavior.  Iowa and Minnesota are, in 
relative terms, high rent areas while North Dakota and Montana are low rent.  Landowners in 
Iowa and, to a lesser degree, Minnesota perceive (correctly) that they are penalized in the EBI 
cost scoring for being high rent enrollments which leads them to bid well below their maximum 
rental rate in an attempt to increase their probability of acceptance. The opposite case holds for 
landowners in low rent areas. This type of behavior is anticipated by our theoretical model.   
 
The Role of Non-Cost EBI Points on Bids 
  Our theory posits that landowners condition their bids on the perceived strength of their 
EBI score relative to other offers.  The empirical results agree.  Across CRDs and signups, the 
marginal estimated effect of additional EBI points (ebi ) – the offer’s non-cost and non-priority 
area EBI points – on the bid are positive where statistically significant and are statistically 
significant in a majority of the CRDs in our sample.  Again, this variable provides an opportunity 26 
 
to contrast high rent and low rent regions.  Landowners in high rent areas increase their bids by 
more than do landowners from low rent areas in response to an increase in their EBI score.  We 
predict that higher EBI landowners will have higher rental rate responses to additional EBI 
points than will lower EBI landowners, a result that derives from the marginal benefits and costs 
involved in increasing a bid.  Iowa and Minnesota are not just high rent areas but also have 
higher non-cost EBI points than do regions in North Dakota and Montana.    
Giving landowners additional EBI points elicits a different response in bids based on how 
landowners perceive the relative strength of their offers among all other offers. In response to 
one additional EBI point – an increase in his probability of acceptance and therefore expected 
return from the CRP – a landowner can increase his bid, an offsetting reduction in his EBI. 
Landowners from high rent areas (in this case also high EBI areas) increase their bid more than 
landowners from low rent areas (lower EBI areas) because doing so doesn’t decrease by much 
their probability of acceptance and, if accepted, guarantees a higher payment.  On the other hand, 
low rent landowners (the lower EBI landowners in this case) receive an increase in their 
probability of acceptance via additional EBI points and increase their bid by a small amount such 
that their net probability of acceptance is greater than before the additional points.  
 
The Role of Prairie Pothole CPA Points on Bids 
  The Prairie Pothole Conservation Priority Area provides an exogenous increase in 
landowners’ non-cost EBI points during these signups of 25 points. The bid responses to these 
points do not mirror the marginal effects on bids of the non-cost EBI points in all dimensions.  It 
is generally true that the marginal effects of priority points on bids is greater in high rent (high 
EBI areas) than in low rent areas.  However, in signups 18 and 20, there are negative responses 27 
 
indicating that landowners reduced their bids relative to their non-priority-area counterparts.   
While initially this might seem anomalous, our theory can explain this type of behavior.  Again, 
landowners maximize the expected return from participating in the CRP. If they perceive the 
benefits (increase in expected return) to reducing their bid to be greater than the cost of doing so 
– what they give up in terms of annual rental payments – then such adjustment is optimal.  This 






Not all EBI Points are Created Equal 
  In the EBI scoring mechanism, a point is a point whether it is a priority-area point, a non 
priority point or a cost-factor point.  However, the empirical results suggest that perhaps 
landowners view these points differently.  Table 4 provides restriction estimates and p-values of 
Wald statistics from the restriction that non-priority area EBI points are equal to the priority-area 
EBI points.  In over half of the CRDs in signups 16, 18 and 20 we can reject they hypothesis that 
the marginal effects on bids from these two point sources are statistically equivalent.  That is, 
landowners who receive the Prairie Pothole priority area points perceive them to be somehow 
different than other EBI points in conditioning their bids. Further, the restriction estimates are 
predominantly negative, an indication that an increase in priority-area points results in a more 
positive effect on rental rates than does an increase in non-priority area points.  While we cannot 
say with certainty why this is the case, a plausible explanation is that landowners perceive the 
priority area points to have a greater environmental value or conservation provision and therefore 
demand a higher return for providing them.  




  The CRP enrolls land by calculating an Environmental Benefits Index value that 
measures the environmental services that result from idling land from production.  The index 
also takes into account the rental rate required by the landowner should his land be accepted.  
Those with the highest EBI points are accepted.  Some of the environmental service points in the 
EBI depend upon the conservation cover the landowner proposes to install, while some EBI 
points are entirely exogenous to the landowner.  Falling into the latter category are points 
resulting from land residing in Conservation Priority Areas like the Prairie Pothole region.  Such 
lands are given favor in the CRP due strictly to location.  Our empirical work addresses two 
aspects of the interaction between exogenous Conservation Priority Area points and endogenous 
rental rate bids.  Specifically, we measure how bids respond to the additional non-cost EBI 
points awarded to bids from priority areas, and test whether landowners in priority areas 
condition their bids on EBI points differently than do landowners outside of such regions.  
We find that landowners do condition their bids on EBI score, as our theory suggests.  
Further, we find that the response to additional EBI points depends on whether the bids are from 
high-rent or low-rent areas.  This response derives from the theory, which highlights the trade-
offs faced by landowners between the benefits of a high bid should the bid be enrolled and the 
benefits from a low bid in increasing the probability of acceptance.  This trade-off creates 
opportunities for those from low-rent areas to increase their expected return to enrolling with 
small increases in their bid while landowners from high-rent areas optimally increase their bid by 
larger amounts. 
We also find empirically that variations in priority area EBI points do not have the same 
impact on bids as do non-priority area points, despite their equivalence in their contributions to 29 
 
the EBI score.  One explanation for this finding is that farmers attach particular utility to EBI 
points that come from Conservation Priority Area designation.  As a signal that valuable 
environmental services are attached to retiring land inside of a CPA, priority area designations 
increase landowners’ probability of enrolling (acceptance).  Landowners optimally respond by 
reducing or increasing the rental rates at which they are willing to enroll, both of which increase 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics of CRP Offers Data by Crop Reporting District, Signup 18
mean std mean std mean std
1950 0 418 $115.76 $16.28 $10.70 $11.04 217.8 34.7
1950 1 340 $135.50 $14.13 $18.46 $14.87 181.1 38.5
1940 0 472 $106.07 $15.16 $7.57 $10.74 211.8 33.8
1940 1 106 $133.38 $14.40 $22.74 $16.67 174.0 34.6
1910 0 130 $107.88 $17.19 $15.86 $16.11 179.6 50.0
1910 1 335 $118.85 $15.82 $20.13 $16.68 157.7 32.3
2750 0 335 $43.62 $14.31 $1.80 $3.73 171.5 36.9
2750 1 446 $79.56 $18.89 $6.42 $8.10 177.6 34.6
2740 0 32 $65.88 $6.77 $5.65 $6.65 140.9 28.1
2740 1 960 $68.91 $20.01 $5.59 $6.97 154.0 29.4
2710 0 36 $38.55 $5.26 $0.59 $1.37 185.6 25.9
2710 1 3467 $43.87 $8.10 $1.53 $2.83 166.0 26.7
3050 0 292 $33.44 $5.26 $0.45 $1.71 159.1 32.5
3050 1 58 $36.57 $4.43 $0.00 $0.00 164.5 31.4
3030 0 436 $30.67 $2.92 $0.53 $1.25 151.4 24.0
3030 1 1201 $29.94 $2.69 $0.21 $0.94 147.5 26.5
3890 0 28 $55.78 $7.21 $3.86 $4.75 139.5 22.4
3890 1 1418 $41.32 $10.50 $0.50 $1.61 129.1 26.8
3860 0 38 $53.02 $7.78 $1.92 $3.54 152.9 30.8
3860 1 862 $40.32 $6.91 $0.30 $1.23 151.2 22.0
3830 0 213 $45.85 $5.31 $3.64 $4.96 144.4 25.8
3830 1 1212 $39.66 $7.28 $1.48 $3.38 128.1 21.0
3840 0 267 $24.16 $2.77 $0.18 $0.63 116.1 30.7
3840 1 238 $32.22 $3.17 $0.57 $1.49 114.1 20.4
3880 0 230 $26.01 $2.14 $0.99 $1.56 110.9 27.0
3880 1 365 $28.57 $2.91 $0.39 $1.25 112.9 22.1
‡ PP = 0 denotes offers that did not receive the PP CPA points; PP=1 denotes offers that did receive the PP CPA points.


















∗ Discount of Offered 







Table 2.  Proportion of County's Agricultural Land in CRP Preceeding Signups by CRD
CRD # Counties Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
1950 12 5.2% 0.3% 11.4% 3.9% 0.4% 8.9% 3.2% 0.6% 6.9%
1940 12 5.1% 0.8% 8.8% 3.3% 0.6% 7.2% 3.5% 0.7% 7.7%
1910 12 3.7% 0.7% 7.6% 2.2% 0.6% 3.9% 1.7% 0.5% 3.1%
2750 14 4.5% 0.6% 8.5% 3.5% 0.4% 7.6% 3.3% 0.5% 7.8%
2740 12 7.1% 2.4% 12.8% 5.1% 1.9% 11.1% 5.5% 1.9% 10.7%
2710 11 16.3% 2.4% 23.4% 11.6% 1.1% 17.3% 12.6% 1.0% 20.2%
3050 10 3.6% 0.7% 5.8% 3.2% 0.5% 5.9% 3.3% 0.8% 6.5%
3030 8 10.4% 3.6% 18.5% 11.1% 3.4% 18.0% 10.9% 3.6% 15.0%
3890 7 7.5% 3.6% 11.1% 10.7% 3.1% 13.8% 9.9% 3.0% 14.0%
3860 5 5.5% 0.6% 10.8% 7.6% 0.9% 15.8% 8.2% 1.0% 19.4%
3830 7 7.5% 1.5% 11.2% 11.0% 3.4% 19.7% 11.9% 4.0% 21.0%
3840 5 5.1% 2.1% 8.5% 5.1% 2.1% 8.2% 4.2% 1.3% 6.5%
3880 5 7.1% 3.0% 11.2% 8.0% 1.7% 12.1% 6.3% 1.3% 10.6%























2 Constant rmax prop ebi PP PP*ebi
26.522 0.419 50.059 0.962 11.032 1.500
(5.205) (0.028) (18.887) (0.286) (1.362) (0.53)
0.000 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.005
20.422 0.413 -45.229 2.523 5.023 -2.173
(3.76) (0.024) (13.068) (0.27) (1.47) (0.668)
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
19.851 0.556 -67.917 0.471 2.917 -0.636
(4.462) (0.031) (22.793) (0.298) (1.275) (0.558)
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.114 0.022 0.255
6.744 0.443 -26.758 1.021 2.850 0.959
(1.273) (0.015) (7.481) (0.159) (0.534) (0.309)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
4.740 0.594 -8.923 0.939 -0.364 -0.619
(1.697) (0.011) (7.07) (0.149) (1.238) (0.933)
0.005 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.769 0.507
9.020 0.352 -6.200 0.081 1.015 -0.222
(0.619) (0.011) (1.06) (0.064) (0.166) (0.145)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.126
3.545 0.059 -31.366 0.103 0.416 -0.247
(0.66) (0.017) (5.44) (0.048) (0.201) (0.138)
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.033 0.038 0.074
2.175 0.210 -3.650 -0.027 0.494 -0.144
(0.277) (0.012) (0.482) (0.017) (0.043) (0.034)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.000
0.874 0.172 6.170 -0.006 0.148 -0.025
(0.235) (0.012) (1.25) (0.023) (0.118) (0.097)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.801 0.210 0.795
1.708 0.211 -0.384 0.105 0.240 -0.352
(0.483) (0.015) (1.52) (0.039) (0.188) (0.133)
0.000 0.000 0.801 0.007 0.201 0.008
4.978 0.210 -17.313 0.257 0.756 -0.615
(0.425) (0.011) (1.49) (0.048) (0.111) (0.117)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.980 0.200 1.640 -0.020 -0.046 0.031
(0.233) (0.02) (1.64) (0.023) (0.088) (0.047)
0.000 0.000 0.317 0.398 0.603 0.506
0.481 0.131 -1.590 0.025 0.308 0.002
(0.154) (0.013) (0.866) (0.014) (0.044) (0.028)
0.002 0.000 0.067 0.073 0.000 0.953
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, p-values below the standard errors.
3880 833 0.825 0.973
3890 1266 0.750 0.986
3840 497 0.757 0.981
3830 1836 0.607 0.864
3860 874 0.715 0.950
3050 456 0.836 0.837
3030 1952 0.706 0.862
2740 1941 0.148 0.795
2710 2429 0.382 0.749
903 0.064 0.393
2750 1401 0.295 0.877
1304 0.053 0.329



























2 Constant rmax prop ebi PP PP*ebi
18.252 0.504 -1.632 1.750 2.099 0.497
(5.564) (0.031) (20.733) (0.304) (1.294) (0.533)
0.001 0.000 0.937 0.000 0.105 0.351
33.328 0.347 -96.356 0.972 -4.050 -0.501
(4.285) (0.031) (23.071) (0.3) (1.475) (0.726)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.490
27.768 0.406 -33.230 1.742 2.186 1.029
(6.804) (0.044) (68.223) (0.465) (1.721) (0.829)
0.000 0.000 0.626 0.000 0.204 0.214
7.311 0.409 -4.421 0.196 0.870 0.512
(1.138) (0.019) (8.795) (0.129) (0.542) (0.263)
0.000 0.000 0.615 0.128 0.109 0.051
7.455 0.513 -30.332 0.410 1.963 0.027
(1.521) (0.015) (8.11) (0.152) (1.077) (0.858)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.069 0.975
3.792 0.310 -8.725 0.188 0.710 -0.438
(0.598) (0.009) (0.862) (0.036) (0.508) (0.401)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.162 0.275
0.845 0.138 -2.500 0.066 0.410 -0.078
(0.28) (0.011) (0.623) (0.019) (0.048) (0.039)
0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043
-0.011 0.162 4.361 0.122 0.736 -0.142
(0.328) (0.011) (1.061) (0.032) (0.203) (0.193)
0.973 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.464
-0.312 0.113 2.209 0.185 0.277 -0.084
(0.379) (0.012) (0.956) (0.036) (0.134) (0.113)
0.410 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.039 0.458
6.312 0.099 -13.582 0.513 1.257 -0.071
(0.641) (0.013) (1.37) (0.077) (0.176) (0.156)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.649
1.118 0.187 -5.760 0.080 0.248 0.112
(0.385) (0.022) (4.879) (0.038) (0.283) (0.078)
0.004 0.000 0.238 0.037 0.382 0.153
1.620 0.225 -0.696 -0.003 0.761 0.182
(0.574) (0.026) (2.57) (0.055) (0.14) (0.106)
0.005 0.000 0.787 0.962 0.000 0.085
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, p-values below the standard errors.
3880 595 0.703 0.820
Cannot be estimated; all offers where PP 
= 1 are censored.
3890 1446 0.790 0.975
3840 505 0.760 0.950
3830 1425 0.668 0.769
3860 900 0.850 0.965
3050 350 0.897 0.919
3030 1637 0.813 0.873
2740 992 0.290 0.883
2710 3503 0.572 0.357
0.097 0.271
2750 781 0.423 0.931
0.146 0.503


























2 Constant rmax prop ebi PP PP*ebi
6.430 0.537 30.571 2.308 3.090 1.628
(4.894) (0.029) (30.402) (0.298) (1.436) (0.553)
0.189 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.031 0.003
6.251 0.477 -90.404 1.966 2.009 0.065
(3.604) (0.027) (15.759) (0.262) (1.437) (0.817)
0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.162 0.937
24.078 0.432 -193.718 2.331 -2.316 3.311
(7.797) (0.046) (104.273) (0.539) (1.878) (1.047)
0.002 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.218 0.002
5.281 0.349 -26.848 0.585 2.064 0.337
(1.186) (0.02) (10.126) (0.16) (0.583) (0.338)
0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.319
2.730 0.448 -18.259 0.508 2.696 1.089
(1.557) (0.017) (8.068) (0.149) (1.205) (0.627)
0.080 0.000 0.024 0.001 0.025 0.082
12.070 0.275 -24.500 0.008 -2.326 -2.158
(1.25) (0.019) (1.61) (0.098) (0.961) (1.51)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.937 0.016 0.152
1.170 0.103 -3.185 0.071 0.475 -0.137
(0.627) (0.021) (1.39) (0.044) (0.105) (0.102)
0.063 0.000 0.022 0.108 0.000 0.177
0.628 0.112 0.780 0.097 0.259 0.046
(0.378) (0.016) (1.835) (0.044) (0.213) (0.152)
0.097 0.000 0.671 0.029 0.224 0.765
0.001 0.092 1.910 0.047 0.791 -0.295
(0.528) (0.018) (1.487) (0.055) (0.233) (0.17)
0.999 0.000 0.199 0.398 0.001 0.083
2.945 0.160 -8.594 0.384 2.850 -0.612
(0.755) (0.021) (2.461) (0.106) (0.362) (0.356)
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.086
1.667 0.148 1.500 0.079 0.189 -0.310
(0.497) (0.026) (5.63) (0.056) (0.275) (0.117)
0.001 0.000 0.789 0.157 0.493 0.008
1.173 0.097 -17.400 0.037 1.091 0.271
(0.419) (0.027) (3.22) (0.034) (0.188) (0.076)
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.270 0.000 0.000
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, p-values below the standard errors.
3880 274 0.799 0.850
Cannot be estimated; all offers where PP 
= 1 are censored.
3890 478 0.856 0.983
3840 339 0.779 0.940
3830 569 0.671 0.873
3860 332 0.886 0.973
3050 189 0.931 0.780
3030 481 0.848 0.870
2740 762 0.392 0.923
2710 1076 0.571 0.813
1910 375 0.160 0.407
2750 653 0.498 0.935
1950 672 0.190 0.581





















Table 4.  Wald Tests of Restrictions on Marginal Effects 
Signup 16 Signup 18 Signup 20 Signup 16 Signup 18 Signup 20
-0.548 -0.413 -0.337 -10.882 -0.407 -0.966
0.300 0.035 0.033 1.432 1.503 1.825
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.787 0.597
-0.554 -0.529 -0.312 -2.700 6.825 -0.062
0.251 0.039 0.032 1.566 1.985 2.004
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.975
-0.394 -0.543 -0.475 -2.667 -0.500 5.653
0.334 0.049 0.054 1.354 1.950 2.331
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.797 0.015
-0.380 -0.271 -0.291 -2.560 -1.203 -3.002
0.160 0.020 0.021 0.768 1.024 1.253
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.241 0.165
-0.297 -0.270 -0.226 1.540 -2.211 -3.780
0.114 0.014 0.014 1.470 1.561 2.105
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.295 0.157 0.073
-0.395 -0.240 -0.323 -1.602 -1.281 5.752
0.143 0.012 0.031 3.052 0.124 2.432




-0.202 -0.154 -0.254 -1.982 -2.111 -2.924
0.028 0.044 0.110 0.173 0.324 0.754
0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.120 -0.135 -0.136 -0.788 -3.274 -1.254
0.015 0.021 0.046 0.612 1.087 1.698
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.198 0.003 0.460
-0.179 -1.099 -0.082 -0.528 -0.729 -7.427
0.027 0.039 0.072 0.731 1.075 2.025
0.000 0.005 0.256 0.470 0.498 0.000
-0.366 -0.653 -0.463 -1.504 -2.621 -8.267
0.018 0.036 0.046 0.342 0.612 1.179
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.104 -0.135 -0.272 0.116 -0.774 -0.544
0.039 0.061 0.083 0.415 1.318 1.472
0.007 0.026 0.001 0.779 0.557 0.712
-0.102 -0.194 -0.123 -1.933 -2.731 -9.527
0.035 0.071 0.138 0.321 0.574 1.818
0.003 0.007 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000
Restriction estimates reported, standard errors are in parentheses, Wald test statistic p-values 
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Figure 2. The Prairie Pothole National Conservation Priority Area (shaded counties) 
 